China’s 20th Party Congress: An Upside Scenario


China’s 20th Party Congress: An Upside Scenario

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China’s 20th Party Congress: An Upside Scenario

Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 20th National Congress, which opens on October 16, there is much speculation about who will be appointed to China’s top governing roles. Of particular interest is the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), where Beijing’s most important directives, decisions, and deals are made.To get more news about 20th national congress, you can visit shine news official website.

But political forecasting is a dicey business. Eurasia Group founder Ian Bremmer once remarked that political science is “bad at prediction” yet can “limit the realm of scenarios.” In that spirit, I will refrain from making a firm prediction and instead present several potential scenarios.

In this first of two pieces, I set out an upside case whereby turnover norms for the PSC are largely upheld.Since 2002, no PSC member has been reappointed at age 68 or beyond, or retired at age 67 or younger (the so-called “seven up, eight down” rule). New PSC entrants almost always come from the wider 25-member Politburo, where retirement has likewise been enforced at age 68 (though some officials have retired early, unlike in the PSC). In addition, a provisional rule issued in 2006 stipulates that officials should stay no longer than two five-year terms in a single position.

For Xi Jinping (69) to win a third term as party general secretary would appear to violate those norms. However, his continuation in power seems less unusual when he is treated as the general secretary, rather than an ordinary PSC member (see Ling Li’s recent explanation in her recent cover article for The Diplomat Magazine). Most of Xi’s five predecessors as paramount leader were reappointed to a leadership role on the PSC after they had turned 68. (Only Hu Jintao and the quickly ousted post-Mao leader Hua Guofeng were not.)

For ordinary PSC members, the age norms are clearer. Assuming these are upheld, Li Keqiang (67) and Wang Yang (67) should both stay on the PSC, as should Wang Huning (67) and Zhao Leji (65). But Li Zhanshu (72) and Han Zheng (68) should both retire, vacating two PSC spots. As Jonathan Brookfield has suggested, the top two candidates for those vacancies are Hu Chunhua (59) and Chen Min’er (62), given their seniority on the Politburo and factional ties.

How Might Specific Roles Be Allocated?

We can only speculate how norm-based turnover would shape the specific party and state roles that make up the PSC. Li Keqiang has already stated that he will not serve another term as premier of the State Council, which will be made official at the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2023. Wang Yang, though older than Li, could succeed him, albeit for a single term. And though unorthodox, Li could accept demotion to a lower-ranking PSC office like chairman of the NPC.

Xi would no doubt prefer to install one of his own allies as the next premier, rather than yet another rival from the Tuanpai or Youth League Faction. But none of Xi’s Politburo allies have the prerequisite vice premier experience. Unless that requirement or other norms are broken, Wang and Hu are the only eligible candidates. And the elderly PSC incumbent Wang seems like a more palatable option for Xi than a rising star like Hu.

 

That would leave Hu as the prime candidate to become executive vice premier in 2023 (and perhaps to succeed Wang as another single-term premier in 2028). The remaining three PSC roles would be divided among Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Chen Min’er, likely in order of seniority. These projections are summarized below.

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